Responding to the CrowdStrike Outage

19 Jul 2024 Responding to the CrowdStrike Outage

Authored by RSM US LLP, July 19, 2024

CrowdStrike, a US-based cybersecurity solution providing endpoint detection and response (EDR) services, experienced a significant technical issue during the early hours of July 19, 2024. This incident, reportedly due to an update made to CrowdStrike’s Falcon antivirus software, primarily impacted Windows PCs causing a widespread downtime on these systems with Mac and Linux hosts remaining unimpacted. The outage has impacted organizations from hospitals to commercial airline flights and even emergency call centers around the globe.

CrowdStrike is one of the most popular endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions currently installed at over 29,000 organizations. ‘EDR’ is a popular category of cybersecurity solutions because they operate directly on laptops, desktops, and servers to identify and block common cyber-attacks like malware and ransomware.

As organizations look to respond to this event, we recommend that they consider the following areas:

1. Start with securely restoring your operations.
2. Understanding your organization’s exposure to similar threats and taking steps to reduce them.
3. Building resiliency to account for and endure future cybersecurity/IT outages.

Securely restoring operations

We recognize there are significant pressures to bring back ‘business as usual’ as quickly as possible. However, it is important that organizations incorporate the following to avoid generating new operational impacts or opening the door to future cyber-attacks.

• Go to the source of truth for fixes. The ‘latest’ news from social media is often untested or specific to individual environments. In addition, cyber threat actors will generate malicious websites indicating quick fixes resulting in the deployment of malware. You should always go to a vendor site or other reputable source, such as your managed security provider, for fix information.
• Reinforce your data protections following the fix. Procedures to restore Windows devices require the distribution of ‘BitLocker’ keys which provide encryption to disk-based storage. These keys should be centrally managed and securely stored. The required distribution of keys to users reduces this control’s effectiveness and organizations should plan to resecure these keys following system restoration.
• Monitor for phishing emails. As with any major issue, bad actors are looking to capitalize and have begun reaching out to organizations masquerading as CrowdStrike support. If you are a CrowdStrike customer, remember to reach out to their support directly for assistance. Cybersecurity vendors will not proactively reach out and will almost always only be responding to support tickets.

Understanding and reducing your exposure

This issue highlights a systemic change in how digital systems have evolved into the central nervous systems of business operations that require careful governance like any other enterprise risk. During your post-incident debrief, we recommend evaluating the following areas to understand your exposure to drive further research and investments to reduce your risk to future events:

• Inventory and evaluate the risks associated with which vendors receive ‘implicit’ trust in your environment. The impact of the CrowdStrike outage is far-reaching due to the level of advanced access it had, not just to its own software, but to the underlying Windows environment. This is a more common operating model in today’s ‘as-a-service’ world. Identifying what vendors receive this access, the level of access, and its purpose are critical to understand your exposure to similar events and to accounting for potential business impacts.
  • Heavily regulated industries such as financial services should anticipate specific questions regarding these vendors as well as third-party risk management practices (see below) in the upcoming assessment cycles.
• Assess your technology stack diversification. This involves steps to review how beholden you are to a single provider which would otherwise adversely affect your operations should one provider go down (think vendor lock-in and single-point-of-failure). Choices exist in the marketplace, which could easily cover your business objective and aid in effective risk management and contingency planning. For example, consider the recent impact of the CDK Global outage which impacted nearly 30,000 car dealerships, or the Change Healthcare event that crippled revenue cycle processes across the healthcare industry.
• Review your third-party risk management practices. As IT becomes more specialized and critical to businesses, they are often turning to third parties for support. Organizations should be consistently evaluating their third-party providers, and even their vendors (‘Fourth’ and ‘Fifth’ parties’ regardless of their market share is fundamental, to ensure that these organizations consistently align with your internal and external regulatory expectations. “Trust but verify” is table stakes.
• Build your understanding of system identities. When we think of system access, our first thought goes to people. However, more often system access is granted to other IT elements to operate program interactions (‘non-human identities’). Similar to our review and cataloging of ‘human users’, organizations should work to inventory and understand non-human identities and the role they play in the software updates.

Maturing your resiliency

In today’s increasingly interconnected world, organizations can work to address risks from these types of events but that risk will never be removed from our digital society. Organizations can increase their operational resilience to these events by developing or maturing a Business Continuity Program. We recommend that organizations consider the following areas to build and enhance your operational resilience.

• Develop and test your business continuity program. Develop and update a ‘Business Continuity Plan’. This documents critical business functions and identifies downtime, manual procedures to sustain critical business operations, even in a limited capacity, during these events. Maintaining these critical business functions (operations) requires continuity strategies and activities for alternate staffing and vendor redundancies.
• Consider ‘Enterprise-as-a-System’ thinking. This approach links business functions to underlying IT to add ‘operational’ context to IT risks. It focuses on using risk management principles to build an in-depth understanding of complex interconnections between systems and how each influences enterprise risk.
• Mature configuration management and vulnerability program execution. These common cybersecurity disciplines require significant operational discipline to deploy and sustain your cyber and IT ‘hygiene’. This review is focused on both quickly responding to risks and balancing inadvertently exposing the organization to new risks are core traits of an effective cyber program.

What to expect in the future?

While this situation and its impacts are still unfolding, it raises important questions and considerations for organizations to monitor:

• Focus on how much trust we place on our technology vendors.
• Reviews and tighter controls around how deeply we let vendors into our environment.
• Potential legal ramifications when a trusted provider causes an outage. Further considerations for implications to parties who recommend specific technology products.

This article was written by Tauseef Ghazi, Robert Snodgrass, Daniel Gabriel and originally appeared on 2024-07-19. Reprinted with permission from RSM US LLP.
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